Assessing the situation and mindful of the need for speed, it was ordered that the camp’s remaining huts be burned, which helped usher the internees to the Amtracs. At first, the disabled, along with the women and children were loaded onto the waiting vehicles, whilst the remaining internees, who were able, formed a walking column and headed for the beach and freedom. As they made their way to the beachhead at San Antonio, in the distance they could hear the sound of gunfire as the Japanese began to counter attack. 

The sound they could hear in the distance was the “Soule Task Force”.  Early on the morning of 23 February 1945 the diversionary force of the118th Glider Infantry Regiment and Company C of the 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion, together with elements of the 472nd and 675th Field Artillery Battalions under Col. Soule, attacked across the San Juan River. They ran into Japanese opposition near the Lechería Hills where casualties were taken, but by mid morning they had cleared the area and were marching towards Los Baños and cutting off the road between the major Japanese “Tiger” Division and Los Baños.  From an elevated position the task force could see, in the distance, the Amtracs on the beach heading back to Mamatid and so Col. Soule ordered his force to conduct a defensive withdrawal and to re-establish its bridgehead across the San Juan River…...their job done

1945  AIRBORNE HISTORY

  LOS BAÑOS RAID

While the Allied forces in Europe were squeezing the German army from both sides and a major Russian offensive in Eastern Europe was under way, February 1945 saw the continue push of the U.S. Pacific Forces in pursuit of their objectives in the Philippines. On Luzon Island, the Japanese army was being pushed back further and further and although inflicting casualties for every yard they lost, becoming more desperate.  So desperate, than news was filtering down to the U.S. commanders, that the Japanese were killing innocent civilians and prisoners of war whilst falling back.

General MacArthur was deeply alarmed about the plight of thousands of prisoners who had been interned in various camps on Luzon since the early days of the Pacific war.  Many had suffered at the hands of their Japanese captors since they had taken over the islands in1942 and MacArthur was concerned that, with deliverance so near, they may be killed. Many were non-combatants and included women, children and missionaries as well as U.S. and British civilian contractors. So, it was with this backdrop that the Los Baños Raid was devised.

On February 3rd 1945, Major General Joseph Swing, Commander of the 11th Airborne Division, was notified of the need to embark on a rescue mission to secure the safe release of the internees at Los Baños camp, which was located on a 60-acre site that was the Agricultural College of the Philippines, some 25 miles behind the Japanese lines. However, with the 11th Airborne committed to a series of battles south on Manila and the defence of Nichols Field and Fort McKinley, immediate deployment was out of the question.  But as an interim measure, Maj.General Swing tasked his subordinates to develop a plan that could be implemented at the earliest possible moment.

In the final assessment of the raid, it must go down as one of the most successful operations conducted by the 11th Airborne Division and a tribute to all those involved. On the day after the raid, General MacArthur sent a special communiqué to the men of the 11th Airborne Division: “Nothing could be more satisfying to a soldier’s heart than this rescue. I am deeply grateful. God was certainly with us this day.”  For once, the success of a mission was not assessed by ground gained or enemy killed, but the number of civilians rescued.  Of the some 2100+ internees all escaped, the only injury being sustained by one female prisoner who received a very slight bullet graze. The same cannot be said for the rescuing force, but considering the nature of the raid, casualties were far less than expected and a testimony to the cooperation of the forces involved.  Because of the jungle skills and intrinsic knowledge of the local terrain by the guerrillas, the Recon. Platoon reached all of its objectives at night and undetected. The triumph of the planning, the intelligence gathered and the actions of the diversionary force, meant that the Japanese were not able to respond, in time, or have any appreciable effect on the outcome.  And of course, the accurate jump and speedy deployment of the paratroopers guaranteed the unbounded success of this mission.    

 Lt John Ringler

The Plan

With information on the ground somewhat sketchy, the planners utilise the help of local guerrillas and volunteers operating behind enemy lines, to help provide information on the Japanese forces, their locations and best possible access routes.  However, the planners received a very important bonus when a civilian engineer, Peter Miles, escaped from the Los Baños camp and made it to the safety of the U.S. lines.  Miles was able to provide invaluable intricate information regarding the detailed routine in the camp, details of troop positions and the exact location of the internees. This proved a great asset to the planners and enabled them to finalise the four-phase plan that was timed to coincide with the guards’ exercise period. The jump phase of this plan was to be implemented by Company B, 1st Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 11th Airborne Division together with the Headquarters Company Light Machine Gun Platoon.

Phase 1 would begin when the 11th Airborne’s Reconnaissance Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant George Skua, together with some 20 Filipino guerrilla guides, would travel behind enemy lines by bancas across Lake Laguna two nights before the raid where they would wait.  At 0700 on 23 February 1945 they were charged with marking the Drop Zones, Landing Zones and the neutralising the perimeter camp guards.

Phase 2 would simultaneously see B Company, 1st Battalion 511th PIR led by Lieutenant John Ringler, with the added support of Lieutenant Walter Hettinger’s Machine Gun Platoon, parachute into a small DZ next to the camp and neutralise the remaining camp guards and secure the internees.

Phase 3 would see the remainder of 1st Battalion board tracked amphibious utility vehicles at 0400 and slip into Laguna de Bay and head for Mayondon Point, near San Antonio, some two miles from the camp. Here they would travel overland and make their way to the camp, scheduling to arrive shortly after 0700. They would then carry the internees back to Mayondon Point and make good their escape to safety at Mamatid village.

Phase 4 involved the 118th Glider Infantry Regiment (minus its 2nd Battalion) and Company C of the 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion together with elements of the 472nd and 675th Field Artillery Battalions, under Colonel Richard Soule, move forward down Highway 1 to act as a diversionary force and to engage the Japanese 8th Division, if necessary, so as to facilitate the escape and protecting the internees flank.

On 20 February the conditions on Luzon Island were such that the various elements could be withdrawn from combat and appraised of their mission. They were ordered to their staging posts and readied to go, with the raid scheduled for 0700 on 23 February 1945.  Success was by no means guaranteed and casualties were expected to be high, but the risks were deemed to be worth it. Accomplishment of the mission would depend on speed and surprise.  The Japanese guards would have to be caught unawares and neutralised before they could take any action. Quickly in and quickly out was the requirement.

 The Raid

Under cover of darkness, on 21 February 1945, Lt. Skua and his platoon left the north shore of Laguna de Bay and headed across the lake in three bancas. Lt. Skua and six men led the way, Sergeant Martin Squires and six men behind and the remainder of the group and equipment in the larger third. They landed near Nanhaya and met with other local guerrillas and some camp escapees at the local schoolhouse, where they finalised their plans and assigned individual tasks.  On the night of 22nd February they began their overland journey through the jungle, rice paddies and by circuitous routes to avoid and locate their various starting points. This they did without alerting the Japanese and were ready and waiting at 0700 the next day.

At 0400 on 23 February 1945 the1st Battalion 511th PIR (less B Company) boarded 54 amphibious tractors “Amtracs”, slipped into Laguna de Bay and headed for Mayondon Point. Again, they too managed to reach their destination without disturbing any Japanese defenders and headed off for the remaining 2 miles journey overland to the camp aiming to arrive just after 0700.

Meanwhile, B Company 511th PIR together with the Light Machine Gun Platoon, had spent the moonless night of 22ndFebruary 1945 waiting at Nicholas Field where, in the early dawn, they donned their parachutes, put on their equipment and loaded onto 9 C47s of the 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, under the command of Major Don Anderson, for the short flight. Flying unopposed by any Japanese aircraft or antiaircraft fire they soon arrived at their destination, which was clearly marked with white smoke by the Reconnaissance Platoon.  At 0700 they jumped to the sound of gunfire below as the Recon. Platoon engaged the enemy.  The Japanese guards were taken completely by surprise and whilst the Recon. Platoon was overcoming the perimeter defences, the B Company force was able to overwhelm the camp guards before they had a chance to respond in force. After a short firefight, the Japanese were defeated and the internees freed. Jubilant at their release, some internees could hardly contain their excitement, some were shocked and some were in hiding. The one thing they had in common was that few were ready to move speedily to the embarkation point where, by this time, the Amtracs had arrived.